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Comments
NOTICE TO VACATE LEASED PREMISES
LOUISIANA ACT 200 OF 1936:1
When any person having leased any house, store, or other
buildings, or landed estate, for a term of one or more years, or
by the month or otherwise, either verbally or otherwise, shall
be desirous of obtaining possession of the said leased premises
upon the termination of the lease, either by limitation or by
non-payment of the rent when due, or any other breach of the
said lease, he shall demand and require in writing his tenant
to remove from and leave the same, allowing him five calendar
days from the day such notice is delivered.
And if the owner or his agent shall be desirious of obtain-
ing the possession of the said leased premises for any other
reason or cause, such as, for the purpose of leasing the said
premises to another tenant or otherwise, he shall give to the
tenant a notice in writing to vacate, ten days before the ex-
piration of the month, if the same be a monthly lease, or thirty
days before the expiration of the said lease, if the said lease
be in writing, and for a term of one or more years or other-
wise, other than by the month.
This comment is primarily concerned with the requirement
of giving notice to vacate upon the termination of a contract of
lease. It is apparent that a distinction is drawn between the notice
necessary to oust the tenant upon termination of the lease by
limitation or because of a breach by the lessee, and that necessary
upon termination because of an expiration of the term. Only five
days' notice calculated "from the day such notice is delivered" is
required in the former, whereas from ten to thirty days' "before
the expiration of the . . . lease" is stipulated in the latter. This
seems a justifiable differentiation because the basis for termination
of the lease contemplated in the first paragraph of the Act is
either a violation of the contractual terms by the lessee or the
occurrence of a contingency which would entitle the lessor to
immediate possession but for the positive directions of the statute.
1. Dart's Stats. (1939) § 6597. La. Act 284 of 1855 was the first of the
series of legislative measures which culminates in La. Act 200 of 1936 [Dart's
Stats. (1939) § 6597]. It became Section 2155 of the Revised Statutes of 1870,
which has since been amended by La. Act 96 of 1888; La. Act 23 of 1894;
La. Act 52 of 1900; La. Act 313 of 1908; La' Act 49 of 1918; La. Act 55 of
1926; and La. Act 200 of 1936.
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In the second paragraph, on the other hand, no violation on the
part of the tenant is contemplated, and longer notice is stipulated
in his favor.
Although the notice required of the lessor under Act 200 of
1936 must be in writing, it need not be made in any special man-
ner or at any particular place; the important requisite is that the
lessee actually receive the notice.2 However, the mere publication
of an advertisement offering property for rent does not constitute
formal notice to vacate.3
NOTICE UPON LIMITATION OR BREACH
The first paragraph of the Act, which has appeared on our
statute books in substantially its present form since 1855,4 deals
with three causes of termination of lease in which notice to vacate
is required: (1) limitation; (2) nonpayment of the rent when
due; and (3) "any other breach."
As to the first of these causes, the word "limitation" has never
been interpreted by the courts. In the Act of 1855, the legislature
may have intended it to be synonomous with "expiration," no
notice in such an event having originally been provided. But the
second paragraph, dealing specifically with notice upon the ex-
piration of the term of the lease, was added in 1908;5 and both
provisions have been continued in the numerous amendments
since that date.6 Since an act should be interpreted in such a way
as to give effect to every portion thereof,' it would seem that a
different interpretation should be found for "limitation," in order
to avoid a serious conflict within the Act itself: It suggests itself
in the light of the common law conditional limitation.
Primarily the term limitation implies the termination of the
lease by the happening of a contingency stipulated in the con-
tract, independent of the will of the lessor or of any breach by
the lessee, "as when land is granted to a man so long as he is
2. Brunet v. Schulman Bros., 177 So. 847 (La. App. 1938). The assignee
of a lessor may remove the lessee by summary process. Walker v. Van-
winkle, 8 Mart. (N.S.) 560 (La. 1830); Norman v. Woods, 8 La. App. 184
(1928). The landlord must show that the relationship of landlord and tenant
exists. Dyer v. Wilson, 190 So. 851 (La. App. 1939).
3. Tuemler v. Latter & Blum, Inc., 188 So. 172 (La. App. 1939). Despite
the clear application of Act 200 of 1936, the court failed to apply it, dis-
cussing only Article 2686, La. Civil Code of 1870. For a more detailed dis-
cussion of the similarities of the two, see text, infra, pp. 166-167.
4. La. Act 284 of 1855.
5. La. Act 313 of 1908.
6. See note 1, supra.
7. Jackson State Nat. Bank v. Merchants' Bank & Trust Co., 177 La.
975, 149 So. 539 (1933), and authorities therein cited.
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parson of Dale, or so long as he continues unmarried, or the like."8
Frequently, however, the occurrence of the objective condition
merely gives the lessor an option to cancel, without a similar
privilege in the lessee. The sending of the notice to vacate as a
prerequisite to a summary proceeding to recover possession of
the leased premises is an exercise of the option granted the lessor.
"A development of the primary form of limitation, in
which the happening of the future contingency is con-
trolled neither by the landlord nor the tenant, is one in
which such future happening provided as a possibility in
the lease is set in motion by the landlord. This is probably
the most frequent type of conditional limitation, and is
well illustrated by the clause which furnishes the landlord
the right to terminate the lease on a number of days' notice
in the event of a bona fide sale of the property . .. or by
express reservation without any reason given .. '.."
Examples of both these types of limitations are contained in
he Civil Code,10 with specific provisions for notice. In the case of
reservation of the right to possession in the event of sale, Article
273911 provides ten days' notice 2 as to all except predial leases,
which are granted a full year's notice; and Article 273413 provides
(by reference to Article 269614) ten days' notice when the lessor
wishes to exercise the unconditional right to possession which he
has reserved. Since these provisions are for specific situations,
they may possibly be interpreted as not being superseded by the
more general provisions of Act 200 of 1936; but it would seem
more reasonable, if the interpretation of "limitation" suggested
above is accepted, to consider these notice articles replaced by
the Act. 15 In this event the notice required would be five days
8. Burnee Corp. v. Uneeda Pure Orange Drink Co., 132 Misc. 435, 230 N.
Y. Supp. 239, 248 (1928).
9. Burnee Corp. v. Uneeda Pure Orange Drink Co., 132 Misc. 435, 230
N.Y. Supp. 239, 249 (1928).
10. Art. 2735 (lessor's stipulation of right to resume possession in event
of sale of property) and Art. 2732 (reservation by lessor of right to dissolve
the lease for the purpose of occupying the premises himself), La. Civil Code
of 1870. Cf. Arts. 1744 and 1761, French Civil Code.
11. La. Civil Code of 1870.
12. By reference to Art. 2686, La. Civil Code of 1870.
13. La. Civil Code of 1870 .
14. La. Civil Code of 1870.
15. Another solution would be to adopt the narrower definition of con-
ditional limitation (see text, supra, p. 162). This would exclude both of these
reservations and consequently leave Articles 2734 and 2739 unaffected by the
provisions of Act 200 of 1936.
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in all instances-a very material reduction from the year pro-
vided for predial leases by Article 2739.
The non-payment of rent clause of the Act is much more
clearly defined. Article 271216 provides that "The lessee may be
expelled from the property if he fails to pay the rent when it
becomes due," and, as was said in a recent case, "The non-pay-
ment of rent 'when due' is a peremptory cause for the dissolution
of the lease and the restoration of possession of the leased prop-
erty to the lessor." 7
Since the failure to pay money due under a contract is a
passive violation, an additional duty is imposed upon the lessor
to put the obligor in default before he can obtain a dissolution
of the lease in case of non-payment. 8 This demand need not be
made on the exact day the rent is due,19 as is necessary under
certain circumstances at common law.2
0
The remaining instance in which only five days' notice is
required, under the first paragraph of Act 200 of 1936, is that of
"any other breach of the said lease." This has been construed to
include a non-compliance with affirmative acts required of the
lessee in the contract; 21 but there has been very little litigation
16. La. Civil Code of 1870.
17. Gaar v. Prudhomme, 181 So. 604, 606 (La. App. 1938). Accord: Jackson
v. Muse, 190 So. 162 (La. App. 1939).
But a lease cannot be terminated by reason of non-payment of the rent
when due, if the lessee was merely awaiting the arrival of the collector who
customarily called for collection of rent notes, although the latter were con-
tractually made payable at a stipulated bank: Gottlieb v. Schloss, 5 La. App.
379 (1927); and if a lessor, month after month, has, without objection or pro-
test, accepted the rental a few days after it was due, he cannot, without pre-
vious notice'to his tenant, claim a forfeiture of the lease: Bacas v. Mandot,
3 Orl. App. 324 (1906), quoted with approval in Standard Brewing Co. v. An-
derson, 121 La. 935, 941, 46 So. 926, 928 (1908). Cf. Saxton v. Para Rubber Co.
of Louisiana, 166 La. 308, 117 So. 235 (1928), in which the lessor notified the
tenant that in the future payment would be required promptly on the date
specified in the contract, and at the office of the lessor. No place of payment
was set forth in the lease, so under Article 2157 payment would be made at
the place of business of the lessee. It was held that the notification was inef-
fective without the acquiescence of the lessee, since it changed the provisions
of the contract.
18. Arts. 1912, 1914, La. Civil Code of 1870. See Ricou v. Hart, 47 La. Ann.
1370, 1372, 17 So. 878, 879 (1895); Bacas v. Mandot, 3 Orl. App. 324, 327 (1906).
19. Hyde v. Palmer and Southmayd, 12 La. 359 (1838).
20. "At common law... a demand for the rent on the day on which it Is
due, at a certain time of such day, and upon the premises, is necessary in
order that the landlord may enforce an express condition of forfeiture for
nonpayment. None of the statutes in regard to summary proceedings assert
the necessity of any such formal demand, though ... sometimes they provide
for a demand for the rent as a part of a notice to quit .... " 2 Tiffany, A
Treatise on the Law of Landlord and Tenant (1912) 1757-1758, § 274(3).
21. Southside Plantation Co. v. Fabacher, 12 Orl. App. 418 (1915) (failure
to maintain a barbed wire fence around the leased premises).
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on the meaning of this phrase. It must apply exclusively to
breaches by the lessee, since the notice to vacate provided by the
Act is only that of the lessor, and a party cannot take advantage
of his own breach to annul a lease.22 Apparently the clause is
sufficiently broad to include dissolution of the lease in the event
the lessee "makes another use of the thing than that for which
it was intended," or damage results from an abuse of the enjoy-
ment of the premises, 28 so that five days' notice would be re-
quired before the landlord could exercise his right to summary
proceedings after dissolution on that ground.
22. See Sigur v. Lloyd, 2 La. Ann. 421, 422 (1846).
23. Art. 2711, La. Civil Code of 1870: "If the lessee makes another use of
the thing than that for which it was intended, and if any loss is thereby sus-
tained by the lessor, the latter may obtain the dissolution of the lease .. "
(Italics supplied.) It has been held that putting to another use and damage
to the lessor are both necessary in order to obtain a dissolution under this
article. New Orleans & C. R. Co. v. Darms, 39 La. Ann. 766, 2 So. 230 (18S7).
The English versions of this portion of the article in the Civil Codes of
1808 (p. 377, 8.3.27) and 1825 (Art. 2681) were identical with that of 1870;
but the French text, which is controlling in the event of a difference between
the French and English versions [Davis v. Houren, 6 Rob. 255 (La. 1843);
Phelps v. Reinach, 38 La. Ann. 547 (1886); Straus v. New Orleans, 166 La.
1035, 118 So. 125 (1928); Sample v. Whitaker, 172 La. 722, 135 So. 38 (1931)]
was taken verbatim from the projet of the Code Napoleon (Book III, Title
13, Art. 38), and uses "or" instead of the "and" italicized above: "Si Is pre-
neur emploie la chose loude 4 un autre usage que celui auquel elle a dtd
destinde, ou dont il puisse rdsulter un dommage pour le bailleur, celui-ci peut
demander la resiliation du bail." Translation: "If the lessee makes another
use of the thing than that for which it was intended, or if any loss is thereby
sustained by the lessor, the latter may obtain the dissolution of the lease."
(Italics supplied.)
The interpretation of the corresponding article of the Code Napoleon
(Art. 1729) has caused a definite split among the French commentators; all
but two agreeing that ou should be interpreted disjunctively rather than con-
junctively, so as to require either a different use or damage to the lessor, or
both. ". . . et on s'dtonne que M. Duranton (XVII, 99) et M. Duvergier (1, 400)
atent cru ndcessaire de remplacer cette disjonctive ou par la copulative et,
pour ne voir ici qu'une seule idde." 6 Marcad6, Explication Th(orique et Pra-
tique du Code Civil (1875) 480. Translation: ". . . and it is surprising that M.
Duranton (XVII, 99) and M. Duvergier (I, 400) had thought it necessary to
replace the disjunctive or [ou] by the conjunctive and [et], so as to contem-
plate here only a single thought."
The position of the majority of the commentators is adequately presented
by Huc: "Il n'est pas ncessaire, pour l'application de ce texte, quail y ait d la
lois changement de destination, et dommage causd pour abus de jouissance.
Lo bailleur pourra demander la rdsiliation dans chacun des deux cas, et 4
plus forte raison si les deux cas se rdalisent." 10 Huc, Commentaire Th6o-
rique et Pratique du Code Civil (1897) 421, no 311. Translation: "It is not
necessary, for the application of this provision [Art. 17291, that there be at
one and the same time a change of destination and damage caused by the
abuse of the enjoyment. The lessor will be able to demand the resolution in
each of the two cases, and all the more so if the two happen together." Ac-
cord: 20 Baudry-Lacantinerie et Wahl, Trait6 Thforique et Pratique de Drolt
Civil, du Contrat de Louage I (1906) 439-446, no 772-778; 25 Laurent, Principes
de Droit Civil Frangais (1877) 285-287, no 263; 6 Marcad6, op. cit. supra, at
479481; 10 Planiol et Ripert, Trait6 Pratique de Droit Civil Frangais (1932)
706-708, no 568; 9 Troplong, Le Droit Civil (1859) 397-398, no 300. Contra: 17
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NOTICE UPON EXPIRATION OF TERM
The second paragraph of the Act, which first appeared in
1908,24 provides the notice which must be given in the event of
termination of the lease because of the expiration of the term of
the lease.2
The language of this paragraph seems very broad, but upon
analysis it is apparent that only two general types of leases are
covered: (1) monthly leases, either oral or written, which are
terminable upon giving written notice "ten days before the ex-
piration of the month"; and (2) written leases "for a term of one
or more years or otherwise, other than by the month," which
require thirty days' notice before the expiration of the lease.2
Not covered by the Act are oral leases, other than by the month;
and consequently there is no provision for the giving of notice
upon the expiration of such a lease. (And, of course, there is no
provision for summary proceedings.) Apparently "for a term of
one or more years or otherwise, other than by the month" would
include written leases for a shorter period than a month, for
which the thirty days' notice would seem utterly inconsistent.
However, since such short-term contracts of lease are almost in-
variably oral, no real injustice is done by this broadness of
terminology.
Notice to vacate urban leases without a fixed duration, which
are "considered to have been made by the month, 27 is doubly
Duranton, Cours de Droit Frangais (1834) 74, no 99, note 2. "Le texte dit:
ou dont i puisse rdsuZter un dommage pour Ie bailleur; mais 41 taut dvidem-
ment la conjonctive et dont t puisse . . . car si c'est suivant la destina-
tion de la chose que le preneur en use, t n'y a pas 4 examiner s'il en rdsulte
ou non un dommage pour le bailleur. Ce dommage n'est mdme pas supposa-
ble." Translation: "The text says: or if any loss is thereby sustained by the
lessor; but it Is evident that the conjunctive and should be used . . . because
if one uses the thing in accordance with the purpose for which it was In-
tended, there is no need to determine whether or not a loss is sustained by
the lessor. This loss is not even supposable."
Thus, through a mistranslation of our Code, Louisiana reached a result
opposite to the position taken by the majority of the French commentators.
It is hoped that New Orleans & C. B. Co. v. Darms will not be followed in the
future.
24. La. Act 313 of 1908.
25. The phrase "any other reason or cause" appearing in the second para-
graph of the Act does not seem to refer to the lessor's reason for breaking
the lease in the direct sense but to the distant reason for which he wishes to
secure possession of the property. The example is given "such as, for the
purpose of leasing the said premises to another tenant or otherwise ......
26. This would include the "lease of a predial estate when the time has
not been specified," which Is "presumed to be for one year," under Arti-
cle 2687.
27. Art. 2685, La. Civil Code of 1870.
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provided: by the Act, and by Article 2686.28 No confusion is
caused by this duplication, because the same period of notice, ten
days, is required by each.29 At any rate Article 2686 is not entirely
superseded by the Act, for the Article requires that notice be
given by either party desiring to end the lease; 0 Act 200 of 1936
applies only to the lessor. Article 2686 presents the only require-
ment imposed upon the lessee concerning the giving of notice to
vacate; and although it stipulates that "notice in writing" must be
given, it has been held that the actual abandonment of the prop-
erty by the tenant without the landlord's consent, but with his
full knowledge,31 is the equivalent of such notice2 2 But since the
notice must be given at least ten days before the expiration of
the month which has begun to run, a lessee who vacates at the
end of the month is liable for the following month's rent.22
The provision for ten days' notice provided in Article 2686
and Act 200 of 1936 (besides applying to leases the duration of
which has not been specified by the parties, that is, "by the
28. Art. 2686, La. Civil Code of 1870: "... If no time for its duration has
been agreed on, the party desiring to put an end to it must give notice In
writing to the other, at least ten days before the expiration of the month,
which has begun to run." Cf. McCarroll v. Newman, 176 So. 140, 142 (La. App.
1937): "The notice provided for under Article 2686 of the Civil Code is one re-
quired to legally determine the termination of a contract of lease if the con-
tract itself does not stipulate the time of its duration. That notice has noth-
ing to do with ejectment of a stubborn tenant who refuses to vacate the
premises after termination of the contract or upon breach of its terms. Pro-
ceedings incidental to regaining possession of a leased premises under such
circumstances are fully provided for under . . .Act 200 of 1936 ......
Prior to Act 284 of 1855, Article 2656 of the Code of 1825 set forth the
only requirement for notice to vacate and Article 2683 of the Code of 1825
provided for summary proceedings to eject after notice was given. These two
articles were carried forward to the Code of 1870 as Articles 2686 and 2713.
All amendments to the 1855 Act, the parent of Act 200 of 1936, have provided
for summary proceedings, rendering the present Article 2713 obsolete.
29. Leonard v. Klein, 2 Orl. App. 85 (1905); Ballay v. Columbia Brewing
Co., 4 Orl. App. 365 (1907); United Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Scallan, 174 So.
674 (La. App. 1937); Brunet v. Schulman Bros., 177 So. 847 (La. App. 1938).
See Parsons v. Iron Warehouse, Inc., 10 Orl. App. 228 (1913), where it was
held that a notice to "vacate the premises as soon as possible" was not a
sufficient notice to put an end to a monthly lease since Article 2686 contem-
plates that the written notice should fix with certainty the date of its termi-
nation.
30. See note 28, supra.
31. If the landlord was absent at the time the tenant vacated, the lease
continues until the end of the month which had begun to run when the land-
lord returned and found his property abandoned. Waples v. New Orleans,
28 La. Ann. 688 (1876).
32. Lafayette Realty Co. v. Travia, 11 Orl. App. 275 (1914).
33. Lafayette Realty Co. v. Travia, 11 Orl. App. 275 (1914).
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month" 4) is also applicable to tacitly reconducted leases of urban
property, 5 which have been held to be by the month.38
The failure of the lessor of a predial lease to give his tenant
notice as prescribed in Act 200 of 1936 does not mean that the
landlord will be forced to submit to a tacit reconduction of the
lease if the lessee wishes to stay upon the premises beyond the
term of the lease. Concerning Article 2688, ' the Supreme Court
said in the case of Ashton Realty Co. v. Prowell.8
"The meaning of that article is simply this: That, if both
parties to the lease remain silent and inactive for the space of
one month after the expiration of the lease, they shall both
be presumed to have acquiesced in, and tacitly consented to, a
renewal of the lease for another year. It has no application
whatever when either party has clearly announced his in-
tention not to renew the lease on the same terms or for a full
34. Art. 2685, La. Civil Code of 1870. By implication it does not apply to
predial leases in which no duration has been specified and which are "pre-
sumed to be for one year" (Article 2687) because the notice is directed to be
given "at least ten days before the expiration of the month, which has begun
to run" (Article 2686). (Italics supplied.)
35. Art. 2689, La. Civil Code of 1870: "If the tenant either of a house or of
a room should continue in possession for a week after his lease has expired,
without any opposition being made thereto by the lessor, the lease shall be
presumed to have been continued, and he cannot be compelled to deliver up
the house or room without receiving the legal notice or warning directed by
article 2686."
36. Murrell v. Lion, 30 La. Ann. 255 (1878). But the tacit reconduction of
predial leases is for a year. Art. 2688, La. Civil Code of 1870. For a discussion
of tacit reconduction see Comment (1938) 1 LOUISIANA LAW RmviEw 439.
37. La. Civil Code of 1870: "If, after the lease of a predial estate has ex-
pired, the farmer should still continue to possess the same during one month
without any step having been taken, either by the lessor or by the new lessee,
to cause him to deliver up the possession of the estate, the former lease shall
continue subject to the same clauses and conditions which it contained; but
it shall continue only for the year next following the expiration of the lease."
(Italics supplied.)
When the required possession is had and reconduction does take place, it
Is only for one year at a time, regardless of the length of the original lease.
Dyer v. Wilson, 190 So. 851, 853 (La. App. 1939).
38. 165 La. 328, 331, 115 So. 579, 581 (1928). In this case the lessor of a
plantation under a written lease for a term of three years did not give the
lessee notice as required under the Act, but upon the expiration of the lease
the lessee notified him that he did not wish to renew the lease. The lessee
then remained in possession under an agreement that he should vacate upon
ten days' written notice from the lessor. It was held that a tacit reconduc-
tion had not taken place under Article 2688 and summary proceedings would
lie against the lessee after ten days' notice. But apparently the court consid-
ered this "agreement" an oral lease with reservation of the right to take
possession of the land at any time (Article 2734), upon the giving of the
notice prescribed in the contract.
In Federal Land Bank of New Orleans v. Sanders, 167 So. 140 (La. App.
1936), the lessor, by reason of affirmative acts, was estopped from dispossess-
ing the tenant upon the termination of a predial lease despite the fact that
the parties contracted against tacit reconduction under Article 2688.
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year, for the purpose of the law is not to force a contract upon
parties unwilling to contract, but merely to establish a rule
of evidence, or presumption, as to their intention in the
premises."
CONCLUSION
Despite the importance of these provisions in the life of the
average man, there has been very little appellate litigation on
leases and notice to vacate, probably because the amount involved
is ordinarily too small to make an appeal worthwhile. Clarifica-
tion by the higher courts is, therefore, not likely to be forth-
coming. The legislature, however, could do much to alleviate the
confusion: (1) by conclusively defining the word "limitation" in
Act 200 of 1936 as a common law "conditional limitation,"3 9 and
amending Articles 2734 and 2739 to resolve the resulting conflict
between them and the Act; or (2) by deleting the word if it was
inadvertently continued after the reason for its inclusion was
lost, thus obviating the apparent inconsistency within the Act
itself.
As discussed herein, the conditional limitation theory appears
to supply the more logical interpretation of the statute as a whole,
but deletion of the word "limitation" from the text of the
Act would seem the preferable solution when the legislature
approaches the problem. In such an event, the reservations by
the lessor would still be covered by the specific codal provisions,
and all requirements of notice to vacate would be reconciled.
JAMES A. BUGEA
USUFRUCTUARY'S RIGHT TO THE PROCEEDS OF OIL
AND GAS WELLS IN LOUISIANA
LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE OF 1870:
ART. 552. The usufructuary has a right to the enjoyment
and proceeds of mines and quarries in the land subject to the
usufruct, if they were actually worked before the commence-
ment of the usufruct; but he has no right to mines and quar-
ries not opened.'
In the development of the oil and gas law of Louisiana, the
courts have been forced to apply, to the situations which arise,
articles of the Civil Code which never contemplated the nature
39. See text, supra, pp. 162-163.
1. La. Civil Code of 1870.
19391
